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THE COURT THAT CHALLENGED THE NEW DEAL
(1930-1936)*
Russell W. Galloway, Jr.**
I. INTRODUCTION
This article discusses voting patterns of the United States Su-
preme Court during the October 1929 through 1935 Terms, the fi-
nal years of the conservative era that lasted from roughly 1890 to the
constitutional revolution of 1937. This was the period in which the
Hughes Court's economic conservatives challenged the New Deal.
The predecessor Taft Court (1921-1929) had been dominated
by a six-vote conservative bloc. At the core of this group were the
celebrated Four Horsemen-Willis Van Devanter, James C. Mc-
Reynolds, George Sutherland, and Pierce Butler, while Chief Justice
William Howard Taft and Edward T. Sanford provided the fifth
and sixth votes. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Louis D. Brandeis, and
Harlan Fiske Stone comprised the liberal, second bloc, which dis-
sented in a small, but significant number of cases.
In early 1930, two events occurred which marked a minor turn-
ing point in Supreme Court history. On February 3, Chief Justice
Taft resigned. On March 8, Sanford died. Suddenly the conserva-
tives had only a narrow four-three margin. Should President Hoover
select moderately liberal Justices, the balance of power on the Court
could shift.
Much was at stake. In October, 1929, the stock market crashed,
and the nation was headed into its worst depression. Over the next
few years, demands for unprecedented government regulation of eco-
nomic matters emerged. The fate of such demands depended heavily
on whether the Court would give up the constitutionalized system of
laissez faire economic policy that had emerged during the prior forty
years. That, in turn, depended on the views of the two new Justices.
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This article will examine the voting patterns of the Court dur-
ing the period from October, 1929 to the end of the October 1935
Term. The voting data will be considered one Term at a time.' Sub-
sequently, the general trends and characteristics of the period as a
whole will be summarized.
II. THE VOTING PATTERNS
A. The October 1929 Term
October, 1929, the month in which the stock market collapsed,
was the start of the Term in which the Taft Court (1921-1929) en-
ded and the Hughes Court (1930-1941) began. During the first few
months of the October 1929 Term, the line-up of Justices occupying
the bench was the same as it had been since 1925 when Stone took
office. As mentioned previously, the Court was dominated by a six-
vote conservative bloc: Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, But-
ler, Chief Justice Taft, and Sanford. Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone
comprised a three-vote liberal bloc.
Taft participated in the first thirty-four cases of the Term.
During this stretch, neither Taft, Sanford, nor the archconservative
McReynolds cast a single dissent. Butler, Sutherland, and Van De-
vanter dissented once to the right in a substantive due process case.2
In contrast, the liberals, Holmes and Brandeis, dissented together
five times, with Stone joining them in three cases.' The following
table shows the Court's line-up in this twilight phase of the Taft era.
1. In brief, the statistical method used is the following. Votes were coded for all deci-
sions with the majority or plurality opinions written by identified Justices. The Justices' disa-
greement and dissent rates were calculated. These data are presented in Appendices A and B,
which contain disagreement and dissent tables for each of the seven Terms covered by the
article. The disagreement and dissent data were then inspected to determine such matters as
bloc alignments, relative dominance, changes in balance of power, and behavior of individual
Justices. The findings, together with illustrative case authorities, are presented separately for
each Term in the next section.
2. Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124 (1929).
3. New Jersey Bell Tel. Co. v. State Bd. of Taxes and Assessment, 280 U.S. 338 (1929)
(6-2) (dormant commerce clause); International Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291 (1929) (6-3)
(antitrust); United Rys. & Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234 (1929) (6-3) (substantive due
process; rate regulation); Farmers Loan & Trust Co. v. Minnesota, 280 U.S. 204 (1929) (7-2)
(due process; tax situs); Railroad Comm'n v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., 280 U.S. 145 (1929) (6-
3) (rate regulation).
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TABLE I
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES -
START OF OCTOBER 1929 TERM
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Holmes Van Devanter
Brandeis McReynolds
Stone Sutherland
Butler
Taft
Sanford
Both Taft and Sanford maintained their conservative voting
patterns during their final months on the Court. They disagreed
with the liberals much more than with the Four Horsemen, as the
following table shows.
TABLE 2
DISAGREEMENT RATES; TAFT AND SANFORD -
OCTOBER 1929 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE DISAGREEMENT RATE
wiTH TAFT WITH SANFORD
LIBERALS
Holmes 17.6% 10.8%
Brandeis 14.7% 7.7%
Stone 9.1% 4.7%
CONSERVATIVES
McReynolds 0.0% 0.0%
Sutherland 2.9% 1.5%
Van Devanter 2.9% 3.1%
Butler 2.9% 3.1%
In December, 1929, Chief Justice William Howard Taft was
disabled by illness. He did not participate after December 9, and
resigned February 3, 1930. Moving swiftly, President Hoover nomi-
nated Charles Evans Hughes to be Chief Justice. Hughes, one of the
giants of Supreme Court history, had been an Associate Justice from
1910 to 1916 and was subsequently Secretary of State and a Wall
Street corporate lawyer. Hughes's nomination was greeted by a
storm of liberal opposition, but he was confirmed quickly and took
office on February 24, 1930.
Roughly two weeks later, on March 8, 1930, Edward Sanford
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died. Of the Taft Court's conservative wing, only the Four Horse-
men remained. After the nomination of the conservative John J.
Parker was rejected by the Senate, Hoover nominated Owen J. Rob-
erts, a former law professor, Teapot Dome special prosecutor, and
successful Philadelphia attorney. Roberts took his seat on April 21,
1930, marking the start of seven years with unusually stable person-
nel. Only one personnel change, the Holmes-Cardozo succession
(1932), occurred during the rest of the 1929 to 1935 period.
During the portion of the Term after Taft stopped participat-
ing, the Court decided an additional one hundred cases. Analysis of
these cases provides little useful information about voting patterns;
all but five were unanimous. Holmes, Brandeis, and Stone dissented
together in four cases," while Butler and Van Devanter dissented in
the fifth.5 Hughes participated in only two divided cases and sided
with the Four Horsemen in both. Roberts did not participate in any
cases since he had been seated on the last decision day of the Term.'
No case of lasting importance was decided.
Analysis of voting data for the October 1929 Term, as a whole,
reveals several interesting patterns. First, dissent and disagreement
rates were very low in comparison to more recent years. Holmes's
7.5% dissent rate was the highest on the Court.' Among those Jus-
tices who sat during the entire Term, all disagreement rates were
below 10%.8 Even Holmes and Butler, at the Court's left and right
extremes, agreed in 91% of the cases.
Second, when disagreement did occur, the Court divided along
rather predictable conservative-liberal lines. Both the conservative
and liberal wings functioned as tight voting blocs with nearly 100%
agreement rates. This can be deduced from Table 3 which shows the
cohesion within the blocs and the higher, but still very low, level of
disagreement between the blocs.
Third, when the Court divided, the conservatives usually domi-
nated. The conservatives won nine of the eleven cases involving bloc
4. Baldwin v. Missouri, 281 U.S. 586 (1930) (6-3) (due process; tax situs); Missouri ex
rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 313 (1930) (6-3) (intergovernmental tax immuni-
ties); Employers Liability Assurance Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 233 (1930) (6-3) (workers' com-
pensation); John Baizley Iron Works v. Span, 281 U.S. 222 (1930) (6-3) (workers'
compensation).
5. Superior Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 280 U.S. 390 (1930) (6-2) (tax).
6. Roberts was seated on June 2, 1930.
7. See infra Appendix B, Table I for complete data on dissent rates during the Term.
8. See infra Appendix A, Table I for complete data on disagreement rates during the
Term.
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TABLE 3
DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1929 TERM
LIBERALS
Holmes 0.8% 1.5% 7.6% 8.3% 9.0% 9.0%
Brandeis - 0.8% 6.9% 7.5% 8.3% 8.3%
Stone 
- 5.4% 6.1% 6.9% 6.9%
CONSERVATIVES
McReynolds 
- 0.8% 1.5% 1.5%
Sutherland 
- 0.8% 0.8%
Van Devanter 
- 0.0%
Butler
voting.' The Four Horsemen cast a total of only five dissents, while
the three liberals, in contrast, cast twenty-six dissents as shown by
the following table.
TABLE 4
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1929 TERM
DISSENTS DISSENT RATE
LIBERALS
Holmes 10 7.5%
Brandeis 9 6.7%
Stone 7 5.4%
CONSERVATIVES
McReynolds 0 0.0%
Sutherland 1 0.7%
Van Devanter 2 1.5%
Butler 2 1.5%
In summary, the October 1929 Term was broken by the Taft/
Hughes and Sanford/Roberts successions. In the early months before
Taft's retirement, the Court was dominated by its established six-
vote conservative bloc. The three-vote liberal bloc cast occasional dis-
sents. After Taft's and Sanford's retirements, the Four Horsemen
retained control and the three liberals continued dissenting occasion-
ally as a bloc. Dissent and disagreement rates were very low, and no
major cases were decided. All in all, apart from personnel changes, it
was an uninteresting Term.
1984]
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B. The October 1930 Term °
After the stock market crash of October, 1929, the United States
moved steadily into the Great Depression: stock prices plummeted,
production and construction dropped. Although President Hoover
broke with traditional laissez faire economic theory and made some
desultory efforts to use government programs to fight the hard times,
the remedies were unsuccessful. Republican fortunes plunged along
with the economy. In November, 1930, the Democrats swept the off-
year elections and took control of Congress. The nation was shifting
to the left.
Voting patterns during the October 1930 Term were similar to
those of the prior Term in some respects. Dissent and disagreement
rates remained in the very low range that was characteristic of that
era of Supreme Court history. Average dissents per case were a mea-
ger 0.28, up only marginally from the 0.26 figure for the prior
Term. The highest disagreement rate on the Court was only 10.1%
(Stone-McReynolds). Once again Stone, Brandeis, and Holmes com-
prised a close voting bloc and occupied the Court's left wing. The
Four Horsemen held down the right wing, as they had in the Octo-
ber 1929 Term. Table 5 illustrates the alignment at the Court's ex-
tremes. The only major change in the alignment of these seven Jus-
tices was McReynolds's sharp shift to the right, as he increased his
solo dissents and moved away from the other conservatives into a
position by himself on the far right.
The most interesting developments concerned the voting pat-
terns of Hughes and Roberts, the two newest Justices. The October
1930 Term was Hughes's first full Term and the first Term in
which Roberts participated in the voting. Given the four-three bloc
alignment of the remaining seven Justices, Hughes and Roberts con-
trolled the outcome in divided cases, so their performance was of
great interest and importance. During the October 1930 Term, both
Hughes and Roberts sided more with the liberals than with the
conservatives. Hughes was closely aligned with the liberals while
10. As in the prior Term, the cases decided during the October 1930 Term were ex-
tremely dull. The most memorable cases were Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931)
(freedom of speech, the "red flag" case), and Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (free-
dom of press; prior restraints), but they stand out like mountain peaks above the desert of dry
economic cases that occupied most of the Court's time. More than 60 of the 166 cases decided
during the Term involved tax law.
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TABLE 5
DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1930 TERM
0 >
LIBERALS
Stone 0.6% 1.3% 6.3% 7.0% 7.6% 10.1%
Brandeis 
- 0.6% 5.4% 6.1% 6.6% 9.6%
Holmes 
- 4.8% 3.6% 6.0% 9.6%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 
- 0.6% 1.2% 6.0%
Sutherland 
- 1.8% 5.5%
Butler 
- 4.8%
McReynolds
Roberts was closer to the center. The following table quantifies disa-
greement rates between Hughes and Roberts and the remainder of
the Court.
TABLE 6
HUGHES'S & ROBERTS'S DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1930 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE DISAGREEMENT RATE
_ WITH HUGHES WITH ROBERTS
LIBERALS
Stone 1.9% 2.6%
Brandeis 1.3% 3.1%
Holmes 0.6% 2.5%
Average 1.3% 2.7%
CONSERVATIVES
VanDevanter 3.8% 3.7%
Sutherland 4.4% 4.3%
Butler 5.1% 4.9%
McReynolds 8.9% 7.4%
Average 5.5% 5.1%
The result of Hughes's and Roberts's siding with the liberal
wing was a small, but significant, shift to the left in the Court's
balance of power. The liberals' dissent rates went down; the conserv-
atives' dissent rates went up. For the first time in years, the liberals
19841
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fared better than the conservatives in the won-lost column, although
the margin was very small as the following table shows.
TABLE 7
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1929 & 1930 TERMS
OCT. 1929 OCT. 1930
TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Stone 5.4% 3.8% -1.6%
Brandeis 6.7% 3.0% -3.7%
Holmes 7.5% 2.4% -5.1%
Average 6.5% 3.1% -3.4%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 1.5% 2.4% +0.9%
Sutherland 0.7% 3.0% + 2.3%
Butler 1.5% 3.6% +2.1%
McReynolds 0.0% 7.2% +7.2%
Average 0.9% 4.1% +3.2%
The liberals won seven of the twelve decisions in which bloc-voting
was present.11
The October 1930 Term was the last full Term for another of
the giants of Supreme Court history, Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr.
Holmes is normally considered a leader of the Court's liberal wing,
and the voting data for the Term confirm this image. Holmes dis-
agreed with his old partner and long-time friend, Brandeis, in only
one out of 166 decisions during the Term. Similarly, he disagreed
with Stone in only two out of 158 decisions. In contrast, he disagreed
with the conservative McReynolds in sixteen of their joint decisions,
or nearly 10%. The following table shows Holmes's alignment in his
final full Term.
11. The liberals won Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (5-4) (freedom of
speech); State Bd. of Tax Commissioners v. Jackson, 283 U.S. 527 (1931) (5-4) (tax; equal
protection); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (7-2) (freedom of speech); Louisville
& N.R.R. Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 740 (1931) (7-2) (ICC); Educational Films Corp. v.
Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931) (6-3) (tax; intergovernmental immunities); O'Gorman & Young,
Inc. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251 (1931) (5-4) (substantive due process; police
power); and Aluminum Castings Co. v. Routzahn, 282 U.S. 92 (1930) (7-2) (tax). The con-
servatives won United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931) (5-4) (citizenship); United States
v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931) (5-4) (citizenship); Indian Motorcycle Co. v. United States,
283 U.S. 570 (1931) (6-3) (tax; intergovernmental immunities); Coolidge v. Long, 282 U.S.
582 (1931) (5-4) (contract clause); and United States v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul, & Pac.
R.R. Co., 282 U.S. 311 (1931) (6-3) (ICC).
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TABLE 8
HOLMES'S DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1930 TERM
Stone 1.3%
Brandeis 0.6%
Hughes 0.6%
Roberts 2.5%
Van Devanter 4.8%
Sutherland 3.6%
Butler 6.0%
McReynolds 9.6%
In summary, the October 1930 Term witnessed a minor shift to
the left in the Court's balance of power. The newly seated Hughes
and Roberts sided with the liberals more than with the conservatives,
giving the liberals a slight edge in the won-lost column. Dissent rates
went down on the left and up on the right. Otherwise, the voting
patterns were quite similar to prior Terms.
C. The October 1931 Term
One of the most widely noted successions in Supreme Court his-
tory occurred during the October 1931 Term. On January 11, 1932,
the venerable Holmes resigned leaving a gaping hole in the liberal
ranks."' President Herbert Hoover, a moderate conservative, might
have pushed the Court farther to the right with a conservative ap-
pointment had he been left to his own devices. However, a ground-
swell of public support for Benjamin Nathan Cardozo as the only
worthy successor of the great Holmes preempted the choice. Car-
dozo, a liberal, was sworn in on March 14, 1932, filling the gap in
the liberal forces and leaving the Court's balance of power
unchanged.
The October 1931 Term shared several common features with
prior Terms. First, the high level of agreement among the Justices
continued. More than four out of every five cases were unanimous.
Disagreement rates crept up somewhat, but rates substantially above
10% remained rare." Second, the decisions issued by the Court re-
mained dull and commonplace. No major cases were decided, and it
12. Holmes remained in close alignment with the liberals, Brandeis and Stone, in his
rinal months on the Court. He agreed with Brandeis in all 45 decisions in which both partici-
pated. He agreed with Stone in all but one of 42 cases.
13. See infra Appendix A, Table 3.
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is somewhat difficult to find decisions worthy of attention.1 ' Third,
the Court continued to split .into a three-vote liberal wing and a
four-vote conservative wing, with Hughes and Roberts holding the
deciding votes in divided cases.
Voting data for the October 1931 Term show a marked shift to
the right in the balance of power. The liberals' dissent rates shot up
to nearly triple the levels of the prior Term. The conservatives' dis-
sent rates, in contrast, hovered slightly below the rather low levels of
the prior Term. The turn toward greater conservative power is illus-
trated by the following table.
TABLE 9
DISSENT RATES-OcroBER 1930 & 1931 TERMS
Oar. 1930 OCT. 1931
TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Holmes 2.4% 11.1% +8.7%
Stone 3.8% 9.1% +5.3%
Brandeis 3.0% 8.7% +5.7%
Average 3.1% 9.2% +6.1%
CONSERVATIVES
Sutherland 3.0% 2.0% -1.0%
Van Devanter 2.4% 2.7% +0.3%
Butler 3.6% 3.3% -0.3%
McReynolds 7.2% 4.0% -3.2%
Average 4.1% 3.0% -1.1%
The shift to the right coincided with a major change in the vot-
ing patterns of Hughes and Roberts. In contrast to the prior Term
when they were more closely aligned with the liberals, 15 these two
Justices crossed over into the conservative wing in the October 1931
Term. Both disagreed with the liberals more than with the conserva-
tives, as the following table shows.
14. The most famous cases were probably Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (5-4)
(equal protection; white primary); New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (5-2)
(substantive due process); and Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (6-3) (substantive due
process). A few major criminal procedure decisions were issued. See, e.g., United States v.
Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932) (8-0) (search and seizure); Blockburger v. United States, 284
U.S. 299 (1932) (9-0) (multiple punishment). In general, however, the dreary parade of busi-
ness, tax, and other economic cases spawned by the Depression continued.
15. See supra Table 6.
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TABLE 10
HUGHES'S & ROBERTS'S DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1931 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE DISAGREEMENT RATE
WITH HUGHES WITH ROBERTS
LIBERALS
Holmes 11.1% 11.1%
Stone 9.2% 7.8%
Brandeis 8.8% 7.4%
Average 9.3% 8.1%
CONSERVATIVES
Sutherland 2.0% 3.4%
VanDevanter 2.0% 4.1%
Butler 2.7% 4.7%
McReynolds 4.1% 5.4%
Average 2.7% 4.4%
The added support from Hughes and Roberts gave the Four Horse-
men the votes they needed to fill out a majority in divided cases."
Cardozo participated in a little over one-third of the 150 cases
decided during the Term, a large enough number to provide a clear
picture of his liberal leanings. He agreed with Stone in all forty-
eight cases in which both voted and disagreed with Brandeis in only
one of fifty-one cases. In contrast, he disagreed with both Butler and
Van Devanter in 15.7% of the decisions, the highest disagreement
rate on the entire Court since Hughes took over in 1930. The fol-
lowing table shows Cardozo's close alignment with the liberals in the
October 1931 Term.
16. Conservative victories in divided cases included the following: Colorado v. Symes,
286 U.S. 510 (1932) (7-2) (removal); Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191 (1932) (6-3) (civil proce-
dure); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932) (6-3) (contract clause); Heiner v. Bonnan, 285
U.S. 312 (1932) (6-2) (substantive due process; conclusive presumption); New State Ice Co. v.
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262 (1932) (6-2) (substantive due process; business affected with a public
interest); Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932) (5-3) (Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers'
Compensation Act); Miller v. Standard Nut Margarine Co. of Fla., 284 U.S. 498 (1932) (6-2)
(tax); First Nat'l Bank v. Maine, 284 U.S. 312 (1932) (6-3) (due process; tax situs); Bradford
Elec. Light Co. v. Clapper, 284 U.S. 221 (1931) (6-3) (federal jurisdiction); United States v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 284 U.S. 195 (1931) (6-3) (ICC); and Chicago, Rock Island &
Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 284 U.S. 80 (1931) (6-3) (ICC; substantive due process, etc.).
The liberal wing won only three split decisions in which more than one Justice dissented.
United States v. Swift & Co., 286 U.S. 106 (1932) (4-2) (antitrust); Nixon v. Condon, 286
U.S. 73 (1932) (5-4) (equal protection; white primary); Pacific Co. v. Johnson, 285 U.S. 480
(1932) (6-3) (tax; contract clause).
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TABLE 11
CARDOZO'S DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1931 TERM
LIBERALS
Brandeis 0.0%
Stone 2.0%
Average 1.0%
CONSERVATIVES
Sutherland 12.0%
Van Devanter 15.7%
Butler 15.7%
McReynolds 11.8%
Average 13.7%
In summary, the balance of power shifted back to the conserva-
tives during the October 1931 Term. Dissent rates on the left tripled
the levels of the prior Term. Dissent rates of the conservatives fell to
one-third the level of the liberals. The change was brought about by
Hughes's and Roberts's sharp shift to the right. Even Cardozo's very
liberal voting pattern was not enough to offset the conservative trend.
D. The October 1932 Term
17
The Term opened roughly a month before the 1932 election
swept Franklin Delano Roosevelt into office. The nation's economy
was in disastrous shape. Despite Hoover's efforts, the Great Depres-
sion had continued to deepen, leaving 12 to 15 million Americans
unemployed. It was a bitter time which called for dramatic change.
Roosevelt's landslide victory over Hoover in the November presiden-
tial election signalled the beginning of a more liberal era in Ameri-
can history, an era in which the conservative Supreme Court would
soon become an anachronism.
Voting data for the October 1932 Term suggest a minor shift
back toward the center. Dissent rates were down somewhat on the
left and up on the right. The pendulum did not, however, swing
back to the left of center. The conservatives retained a narrow mar-
gin in the won-lost statistics, as the following table shows.
17. No personnel changes occurred during the Term or during any later Term covered
by this article.
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TABLE 12
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1931 & 1932 TERMS
OCr. 1931 Ocr. 1932
TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Stone 9.1% 7.7% -1.4%
Cardozo 7.8% 6.5% -1.3%
Brandeis 8.7% 5.4% -3.3%
Average 8.7% 6.6% -2.1%
CONSERVATIVES
Sutherland 2.0% 3.0% +1.0%
McReynolds 4.0% 4.8% +0.8%
Butler 3.3% 6.0% + 2.7%
Average 3.1% 4.6% + 1.5%
The conservatives won seven of the twelve cases involving identifi-
able bloc-voting. 8
Hughes and Roberts were approximately in the center between
the Court's extremes. This represented a shift to the left from the
prior Term when both Justices were more closely aligned with the
Four Horsemen. As the following table shows, Hughes was almost
exactly in the center, with Roberts a little right of center.
18. Conservative victories in divided cases included: Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238
(1933) (7-2) (federal jurisdiction); Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (6-3)
(equal protection; tax); Burnet v. Guggenheim, 288 U.S. 280 (1933) (6-2) (tax); Rocco v.
Lehigh Valley R.R. Co., 288 U.S. 275 (1933) (7-2) (personal injury); Anglo-Chilian Nitrate
Sales Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933) (6-3) (dormant commerce clause); Rogers v.
Guaranty Trust Co., 288 U.S. 123 (1933) (5-3) (conflict of laws); ICC v. Oregon-Washington
R.R. & Nay. Co., 288 U.S. 14 (1933) (6-3) (scope of Interstate Commerce Act).
Liberal victories included: Los Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Railroad Comm'n, 289 U.S.
287 (1933) (6-2) (substantive due process; utility rates); FTC v. Royal Milling Co., 288 U.S.
212 (1933) (7-2) (unfair competition); Cook v. United States, 288 U.S. 102 (1933) (6-2) (trea-
ties); ICC v. New York, New Haven & Hartford R.R. Co., 287 U.S. 178 (1932) (4-3) (man-
damus); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (7-2) (due process; assistance of counsel).
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TABLE 13
ROBERTS'S DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1932 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE
WITH HUGHES
DISAGREEMENT RATE
WITH ROBERTS
LIBERALS
Stone 7.3% 7.2%
Brandeis 4.9% 7.8%
Holmes 6.1% 5.5%
Average 6.1% 6.9%
CONSERVATIVES
Sutherland 3.7% 4.2%
McReynolds 6.1% 3.6%
Butler 8.0% 7.3%
Average 5.9% 5.1%
In his first full Term, Cardozo lined up with the liberals, Stone
and Brandeis, although not as tightly as in the prior Term and later
Terms. He was closest to Stone and farthest from Butler and Mc-
Reynolds. Table 14 elucidates Cardozo's alignment with the liberals.
TABLE 14
CARDOZO'S DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1932 TERM
LIBERALS
Stone 2.4%
Brandeis 6.0%
Average 4.2%
CONSERVATIVES
Sutherland 9.6%
McReynolds 11.3%
Butler 11.4%
Average 10.8%
Several other patterns are worth only passing comment. As in
the prior two Terms, the Court in the October 1932 Term continued
to grind out the economic cases that arose from the Depression. The
most famous landmark of the Term was undoubtedly Powell v. Ala-
bama,19 the renowned Scottsboro case, in which the Court held for
the first time that the fourteenth amendment due process clause re-
19. 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
HUGHES'S &
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quired appointment of counsel for indigent criminal defendants. But-
ler and McReynolds dissented. Other than that, the fare was mea-
ger.'0 Dissent and disagreement rates remained at roughly the same
level as for the prior Term.' 1 The highest disagreement rate was a
mere 12.7% (Stone-Butler), and only six pairs of Justices had disa-
greement rates above 10%. Both the liberal and conservative blocs
were a little less cohesive than before. In fact, the closest trio on the
Court were Hughes, Roberts, and Van Devanter who occupied the
center.
In summary, Cardozo lined up with the liberal wing in the
1932 Term, leaving the Court with the same 3-2-4 conservative plu-
rality as before the Holmes/Cardozo succession. A minor shift to the
left by Hughes and Roberts caused a corresponding shift in the over-
all voting profile, leaving the conservative wing with a narrow edge
over the liberal wing. The Term was uneventful.
E. The October 1933 Term
Voting patterns during the October 1933 Term were almost
identical to those of the prior Term. 83.4% of the decisions were
unanimous. When divisions did occur, they tended to follow the es-
tablished pattern-the three liberals squaring off against the con-
servative Four Horsemen. The highest disagreement rates were be-
tween Stone and Cardozo on the left and McReynolds and Butler on
the right. Brandeis, Van Devanter, and Sutherland had more moder-
ate voting records. Table 15 portrays the disagreement rates among
the various Justices.
- The alignment of Hughes and Roberts, the Court's swing votes,
was also almost identical to that of the prior Term. Hughes was
slightly left of center while Roberts was slightly right of center.
Hughes's voting record was similar to that of Brandeis, the most
moderate member of the liberal wing. Roberts's record was similar
20. A few interesting criminal procedure cases were decided. See, e.g., Sorrells v. United
States, 287 U.S. 435 (1933) (5-4) (entrapment); Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932)
(7-2) (search and seizure); Grau v. United States, 287 U.S. 124 (1932) (7-2) (search and
seizure); Gebardi v. United States, 287 U.S. 112 (1932) (9-0) (conspiracy).
21. 83.9% of the decisions were unanimous.
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DISAGREEMENT
TABLE 15
RATES - OCTOBER
LIBERALS
Stone 2.6% 5.2% 10.5% 11.8% 13.5% 14.2%
Cardozo - 5.1% 9.0% 10.4% 12.1% 12.7%
Brandeis - 7.7% 7.8% 10.8% 8.9%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter - 1.3% 4.5% 3.9%
Sutherland - 4.5% 2.6%
McReynolds - 4.5%
Butler
to that of Van Devanter, the most moderate of the conservatives. Ta-
ble 16 sets forth a comparative representation of the disagreement
rates of Justices Hughes and Roberts.
TABLE 16
HUGHES'S & ROBERTS'S DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1933 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE DISAGREEMENT RATE
WITH HUGHES WITH ROBERTS
LIBERALS
Stone 6.5% 9.7%
Cardozo 5.1% 9.6%
Brandeis 5.1% 4.5%
Average 5.6% 7.9%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 4.5% 4.5%
Sutherland 5.9% 3.3%
McReynolds 7.7% 6.4%
Butler 8.3% 4.5%
Average 6.6% 4.7%
As in the prior two Terms, the conservatives held a narrow ad-
vantage in the overall won-lost figures, as the following table
illustrates.
1933 TERM
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TABLE 17
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1933 TERM
,JUSTICE DISSENT RATE
LIBERALS
Stone 8.4%
Cardozo 7.0%
Brandeis 5.7%
Average 7.0%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 1.9%
Sutherland 3.2%
McReynolds 5.1%
Butler 5.7%
Average 4.0%
The conservatives won eleven of eighteen bloc-voting cases... With
the sole exception of Butler, each Justice's dissent rate increased,
pushing the average number of dissents per case to 0.42, a low figure
by standards of later years, but the first average dissent rate above
0.40 since the commencement of Hughes's Chief Justiceship.
In the October 1933 Term, major cases began to reach the
Court involving anti-Depression economic regulations.2 New Deal
legislation was still a year or so away from being tested in the Court,
but the States had gotten an early start and their anti-Depression
measures reached the Court sooner. The two most famous cases of
the Term were Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell"' which up-
held the Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium Law against a contract
22. Conservative victories in divided cases included: Concordia Fire Ins. Co. v. Illinois,
292 U.S. 535 (1934) (5-3) (tax; equal protection); Helvering v. New York Trust Co., 292 U.S.
455 (1934) (6-3) (tax); Reynolds v. United States, 292 U.S. 443 (1934) (7-2) (veterans bene-
fits); Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S. 190 (1934) (5-4) (garnishment); Arrow-
Hart & Hegeman Elec. Co. v. FTC, 291 U.S. 587 (1934) (5-4) (Clayton Act); Helvering v.
Falk, 291 U.S. 183 (1934) (6-3) (tax); Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934) (6-3) (tax);
Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933) (7-2) (full faith and credit); Southern Ry.
Co. v. Virginia, 290 U.S. 190 (1933) (6-3) (taking of property).
Liberal victories included: Life & Cas. Ins. Co. v. McCray, 291 U.S. 566 (1934) (6-3)
(substantive due process; equal protection); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (5-4)
(substantive due process; equal protection; milk price regulation); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n
v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (5-4) (contract clause; due process); Kraus Bros. Lumber Co.
v. Dimon S.S. Corp., 290 U.S. 117 (1933) (5-4) (maritime liens).
23. "It was not until 1934 that cases involving government power to deal with Depres-
sion problems caused the Court to speak." R. JACKSON, THE STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL
SUPREMACY 78 (1941) [hereinafter cited as R. JACKSON].
24. 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
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clause challenge, and Nebbia v. New York" which upheld New
York's maximum milk price regulation against substantive due pro-
cess and equal protection challenges. In both cases, Hughes and
Roberts joined the three liberals, while the Four Horsemen dis-
sented. These two decisions gave some hope to the Roosevelt Admin-
istration that the major New Deal reforms passed during the "100
Days" might also withstand the challenge of the third branch.""
Apart from Blaisdell and Nebbia, no landmark cases were decided
during the Term.
The October 1933 Term, in summary, was a typical Term for
the early Hughes Court; the Court was unanimous in most cases.
When splits occurred, the conservative Four Horsemen held a slight
advantage over the three liberals, with Hughes and Roberts casting
the swing votes.
F. The October 1934 Term
The cases decided during the October 1934 Term were more
interesting than those decided in the prior five Terms. 7 The flow of
important cases involving government action designed to combat the
Depression increased. This was the Term in which New Deal cases
began to reach the Court, and the Court commenced to strike down
economic reform legislation with increasing frequency. The Court's
famous battle against the New Deal was on. Surprisingly, the liber-
als went along with the conservatives in four of the five most famous
cases.38 Only one of the anti-New Deal decisions involved pure bloc-
voting.2'
25. 291 U.S. 502 (1934). Nebbia was a true landmark case which marked a turning
point in price regulation cases. It rejected the Taft Court's narrow version of the "business
affected with a public interest" doctrine and returned to the liberal doctrine of Munn v. Illi-
nois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), that government may regulate prices whenever the activities of the
business enterprise actually affect the public interest.
26. "[T]he surface indications confirmed the optimists in their belief that the Court
would sustain reform and experimental legislation." R. JACKSON, supra note 23, at 82.
27. In addition to the cases discussed below, the following are worth noting: Grovey v.
Townsend, 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (9-0) (equal protection; the white primary); Norris v. Ala-
bama, 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (8-0) (jury discrimination; the second Scottsboro case); Baldwin v.
Seelig, 294 U.S. 511 (1935) (9-0) (dormant commerce clause).
28. Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (9-0) (removal of FTC
Commissioner); Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (9-0) (sub-
stantive due process; Frazier-Lemke farm mortgage statute); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp.
v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (9-0) (commerce power; delegation of legislative power;
National Industrial Recovery Act); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (8-1)
(delegation of legislative power; "hot oil" provisions of National Industrial Recovery Act; only
Cardozo dissented).
29. Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (5-4) (substantive
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The most striking aspect of the voting data for the October 1934
Term is the vivid bloc alignments. Both the conservative and liberal
wings tightened up considerably. For example, Van Devanter, Suth-
erland, and McReynolds did not disagree in a single decision. Simi-
larly, Brandeis moved back into close alignment with Stone and Car-
dozo. The following table shows the cohesion within the blocs and
the still rather low disagreement rates between the Court's
extremes.80
TABLE 18
DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER 1934 TERM
z°
LIBERALS
Stone 2.5% 1.9% 10.2% 10.2% 9.8% 11.5%
Cardozo - 3.2% 10.2% 10.2% 9.8% 11.5%
Brandeis - 9.7% 9.7% 10.0% 11.0%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter - 0.0% 0.0% 1.3%
Sutherland - 0.0% 1.3%
McReynolds
Butler
Hughes and Roberts were a close pair in the center. They dis-
agreed in only 4 of 155 cases. Hughes was almost exactly in the
Court's statistical center. Roberts was once again a statistical moder-
ate conservative, leaning toward the conservative wing but not fully
aligning with it. The dissent rates set forth in Table 19 illustrate the
alignment of Hughes and Roberts.
due process; Railroad Retirement Act of 1934). The one major New Deal victory of the Term,
involving legislation nullifying so-called "gold clauses," was announced in a trilogy of decisions
with pure five-four bloc-voting. See Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240
(1935), and companion cases.
30. 86.6% of the decisions issued during the Term were unanimous.
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TABLE 19
ROBERTS'S DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1934 TERM
DISAGREEMENT RATE DISAGREEMENT RATE
WITH HUGHES WITH ROBERTS
LIBERALS
Stone 5.2% 7.6%
Cardozo 6.5% 8.9%
Brandeis 4.6% 7.1%
Average 5.4% 7.9%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 5.2% 5.1%
Sutherland 5.2% 5.1%
McReynolds 5.3% 5.2%
Butler 6.5% 3.8%
Average 5.5% 4.8%
As in the prior three Terms, the conservatives held the edge in
the won-lost column. The average dissent rate of the liberals was
nearly twice that of the conservatives. Stone, Cardozo, and Brandeis
cast more dissents (thirty-two) than all four core conservatives
(twenty-two). Table 20 exemplifies the higher dissent rates among
the liberals.
TABLE 20
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1934 TERM
JUSTICE DISSENT RATE
LIBERALS
Stone 7.0%
Cardozo 7.0%
Brandeis 6.5%
Average 6.8%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 3.2%
Sutherland 3.2%
McReynolds 3.3%
Butler 4.5%
Average 3.5%
In thirteen cases perfect bloc-voting patterns emerged aligning Stone,
Cardozo, and Brandeis against Butler, McReynolds, Sutherland, and
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Van Devanter. The conservatives won eight."1
In summary, the Court's pitched battle against the New Deal
began in the October 1934 Term. The Court dealt the New Deal at
least six major defeats during the Term. Disagreement rates among
the Justices remained low, but when the Justices did differ, they
divided into nearly perfect bloc alignments. Butler, McReynolds,
Sutherland, and Van Devanter comprised an almost unanimous con-
servative bloc, while Stone, Cardozo, and Brandeis comprised a very
cohesive liberal bloc. Hughes and Roberts moved back and forth be-
tween the blocs, giving the conservatives enough support to win a
majority of the divided cases.
G. The October 1935 Term
The war between the Supreme Court and the Roosevelt Admin-
istration intensified during the October 1935 Term. In contrast to
the October 1929 through October 1933 Terms, the session was
characterized by a large number of interesting cases. Undoubtedly
the most famous cases were ones involving anti-Depression economic
reform activity. Repeatedly, the Court inflicted severe defeats on the
advocates of the emerging welfare state. 2 In addition, the Court is-
sued a number of important decisions involving non-economic
issues."3
31. The conservative victories were West v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 295 U.S.
662 (1935) (6-3) (substantive due process; utility rates); Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441
(1935) (6-3) (federal question jurisdiction); Senior v. Braden, 295 U.S. 422 (1935) (6-3) (due
process; tax situs); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (5-4)
(substantive due process; railroad pensions); Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 193 (1935) (6-3) (regulation of stockyards); Georgia Ry. & Elec. Co. v. City
of Decatur, 295 U.S. 165 (1935) (6-3) (substantive due process); Stewart Dry Goods Co. v.
Lewis, 294 U.S. 550 (1935) (6-3) (tax; equal protection); and Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474
(1935) (5-4) (seventh amendment right to jury trial).
The liberal victories were Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580 (1935)
(5-4) (corporations; equal protection); Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935) (5-4) (gold
clause companion case); North v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935) (5-4) (gold clause com-
panion case); Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (5-4) (Congress'
power to enact gold clause legislation; contract clause); and Fox v. Standard Oil Co., 294 U.S.
87 (1935) (5-4) (tax; substantive due process; equal protection).
32. Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (5-4) (substantive due
process; minimum wage legislation); Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist.,
298 U.S. 513 (1936) (5-4) (bankruptcy); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (5-4)
(federal commerce power; Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935); Jones v. SEC, 298
U.S. 1 (1936) (6-3) (Securities Act of 1933); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (6-3)
(spending power; Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933); Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404
(1935) (6-3) (equal protection; privileges and immunities; state income tax).
33. E.g. Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (9-0) (landmark case holding, for
the first time, that admission of a coerced confession violates the fourteenth amendement due
1984]
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Voting data for the October 1935 Term show a substantial shift
to the right. The average dissent rate of the three liberals jumped by
more than two-thirds. Each of the three broke the old Hughes Court
record for full-Term dissent rate.3 4 In contrast, the average dissent
rate of the Four Horsemen declined marginally, falling below the
already low level of the prior term. The following table shows the
dramatic increase in the dissent rates among the liberals.
TABLE 21
DISSENT RATES-OCTOBER 1934 & 1935 TERMS
OCT. 1934 OCT. 1935
TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Cardozo 7.0% 11.7% +4.7%
Stone 7.0% 11.3% +4.3%
Brandeis 6.5% 11.1% +4.6%
Average 6.8% 11.4% + 4.6%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 3.2% 1.4% -1.8%
Sutherland 3.2% 3.5% +0.3%
Butler 4.5% 3.4% -1.1%
McReynolds 3.3% 4.2% + 0.9%
Average 3.5% 3.1% -0.4%
The three liberals cast nearly three times as many dissents (49) as
all Four Horsemen (18) and nearly twice as many as all six moder-
ates and conservatives (27).
The main cause of the emergence of conservative dominance in
the October 1935 Term was Roberts's shift to the right. In his first
Term, Roberts was closer to the liberals than to the conservatives.
Thereafter, he was right of center, but usually not too far. In the
October 1935 Term, however, Roberts was closely aligned with the
conservative bloc. He sided with the conservatives in eighteen of the
twenty-three bloc-voting cases decided during the Term. The follow-
ing table shows Roberts's shift to the right.
process clause); Grossjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (9-0) (freedom of
speech); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935) (6-3) (tax penalty).
34. Brandeis's 11.1% dissent rate was matched by Holmes in the October 1931 Term,
but Holmes participated in fewer than one-third of the cases decided in that Term. The high-
est prior full-Term dissent rate of the Hughes era was Stone's 9.1% rate in the October 1931
Term.
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TABLE 22
ROBERTS'S DISAGREEMENT RATES-
OCTOBER 1930, 1934 & 1935 TERMS
OCT. 1930 OCT. 1934 OCT. 1935
TERM TERM TERM CHANGE
LIBERALS
Cardozo - 8.9% 14.7% +5.8%
Stone 2.6% 7.6% 14.4% +11.8%
Brandeis 3.1% 7.1% 14.1% +11.0%
Average 2.8% 7.9% 14.4% +11.6%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 3.7% 5.1% 4.3% +0.6%
Sutherland 4.3% 5.1% 2.1% -1.2%
Butler 4.9% 3.8% 3.5% -1.4%
McReynolds 7.4% 5.2% 5.6% -1.8%
Average 5.1% 4.8% 3.9% -1.2%
Hughes also shifted from slightly left of center to slightly right of
center in the October 1935 Term."5
Data concerning disagreement rates, as set forth in Table 23,
suggest that the liberal and conservative wings were more polarized
than in prior Terms. The number of bloc-voting cases jumped to
twenty-three."6 For the first time since the start of the Hughes era,
35. See infra Appendix A, Tables 6, 7.
36. Conservative victories in bloc-voting cases included: Morehead v. New York ex rel.
Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (5-4) (substantive due process; state minimum wage law); Ash-
ton v. Cameron County Water Improvement Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936) (5-4) (scope of federal
bankruptcy power); United States v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Ry. Co., 298 U.S. 492 (1936) (6-
3) (Interstate Commerce Act); Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S. 393 (1936) (6-2) (intergovern-
mental tax immunity); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (5-4) (federal com-
merce power; tenth amendment; substantive due process); Jones v. SEC, 298 U.S. 1 (1936) (6-
3) (SEC sanction proceedings must be terminated upon withdrawal of false statement);
Mayflower Farms v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936) (6-3) (equal protection; milk price regu-
lations); Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Weeks, 297 U.S. 135 (1936) (6-3) (substantive due pro-
cess; equal protection; tax); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (6-3) (Agricultural
Adjustment Act held unconstitutional; tenth amendment; spending power); Colgate v. Harvey,
296 U.S. 404 (1935) (6-3) (privileges or immunities; equal protection; tax); United States v.
Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935) (6-3) (tenth amendment); Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania, 296 U.S. 113 (1935) (6-3) (tax); McFeely v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 102 (1935) (6-3)
(tax); Helvering v. St. Louis Union Trust Co., 296 U.S. 39 (1935) (5-4) (tax).
Liberal victories in bloc-voting cases included: Borden's Farm Prods. Co. v. Ten Eyck,
297 U.S. 251 (1936) (5-4) (equal protection; milk price regulation); United States v. Safety
Car Heating & Lighting Co., 297 U.S. 88 (1936) (6-3) (tax); McCandless v. Furlaud, 296
U.S. 140 (1935) (5-4) (stock fraud); Helvering v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 296 U.S. 85
(1935) (5-4) (substantive due process; tax); Becker Steel Co. v. Cummings, 296 U.S. 74 (1935)
(7-2) (alien property).
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full-Term disagreement rates between Justices at the Court's ex-
tremes climbed above 15%,8" with five pairs of Justices posting disa-
greement rates above this level. The 16.0% disagreement rate be-
tween Cardozo and McReynolds was the highest in many years.
TABLE 23
DISAGREEMENT RATES - OCTOBER, 1935 TERM
Z
LIBERALS
Cardozo 0.0% 0.7% 13.5% 15.3% 15.2% 16.0%
Stone - 0.7% 13.1% 14.9% 14.9% 15.7%
Brandeis - 12.9% 14.7% 14.6% 15.4%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter - 2.1% 2.1% 2.9%
Sutherland - 1.4% 2.8%
Butler - 1.4%
McReynolds _
As Table 23 shows, both blocs were cohesive. The liberals were es-
pecially close. Cardozo and Stone agreed in all of the 141 cases in
which they both participated. Brandeis disagreed with Cardozo and
Stone only once.
In summary, the Court was unusually polarized during the Oc-
tober 1935 Term; the conservatives were dominant. With the help of
strong support from Roberts and mixed support from Hughes, the
Four Horsemen were able to take command and mount a concerted
attack on the economic reforms characteristic of the New Deal era.
In response, the three liberals dissented as a bloc in fifteen cases,
many involving important constitutional issues in the economic
arena. A constitutional impasse was at hand, and the stage was set
for the constitutional revolution of 1937.
III. TRENDS DURING THE OCTOBER 1929 THROUGH OCTOBER,
1935 TERMS
A. Voting Patterns
The Court's line-up during most of the period covered by this
37. Cardozo had 15.7% disagreement rates with Butler and Van Devanter in the Octo-
ber 1931 Term, but he participated in only one-third of the cases decided in the Term. The
prior record was the 14.2% disagreement rate between Stone and Butler in the October 1933
Term.
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article was four conservatives, three liberals, and two moderates. Ta-
ble 24 illustrates the alignment of the Justices. On the right were the
Four Horsemen: from the extreme to the more moderate, McReyn-
olds, Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter. On the left were Stone,
Brandeis, and Holmes/Cardozo. Hughes and Roberts were the
moderates.
TABLE 24
ALIGNMENT OF JUSTICES -
OCTOBER 1930 THROUGH 1935 TERMS
LIBERAL MODERATE CONSERVATIVE
Stone Hughes McReynolds
Brandeis Roberts Butler
Holmes/Cardozo Sutherland
Van Devanter
In general, the conservative wing fared better than the liberal
wing during the 1930-1936 period. The conservatives were able to
pick up an extra vote from the moderates often enough to win
roughly two out of every three bloc-voting cases. As a result, the
average dissent rate of the liberals was more than twice that of the
conservatives. As Table 25 shows, however, the lowest dissent rates
on the Court belonged to the moderates, Hughes and Roberts, whose
swing votes created the majority in the close cases.
The conservative bloc maintained its power by voting very cohe-
sively, with Butler, Sutherland, and Van Devanter especially close.
Sutherland and Van Devanter, for example, disagreed only twelve
times in more than one thousand cases in which both participated,
achieving an agreement rate of nearly 99%. McReynolds had the
most disagreements with the other conservatives, but
19841
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TABLE 25
DISSENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1929 THROUGH 1935 TERMS
[Vol. 24
DISSENT
CASES DISSENTS RATE
LIBERALS
Cardozo 678 54 8.0%
Stone 1052 79 7.5%
Brandeis 1071 71 6.6%
Holmes 345 19 5.5%
Average 7.1%
MODERATE
Hughes 977 17 1.7%
Roberts 932 17 1.8%
Average 1.8%
CONSERVATIVE
Van Devanter 1068 23 2.2%
Sutherland 1070 29 2.7%
Butler 1075 44 4.1%
McReynolds 1070 45 4.2%
Average 3.3%
even his agreement rates were above 96%. Table 26 illustrates the
intra-conservative disagreement rates.
TABLE 26
CONSERVATIVES' DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1929 THROUGH 1935 TERMS
VAN
DEVANTER SUTHERLAND BUTLER MCREYNOLDS
1.1% 2.3% 3.6%12/1061 24/1065 38/1062
SUTHERLAND 1.9% 3.5%
20/1067 37/1064
BUTLER 3.8%41/1069
McREYNOLDS
Cohesion among the conservatives peaked during the October 1934
Term when McReynolds, Sutherland, and Van Devanter did not
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disagree a single, time.
Disagreement rates within the liberal bloc were even lower.
Holmes, for example, disagreed with Brandeis in only two of the
344 cases in which both participated before Holmes retired. Simi-
larly, Holmes agreed with Stone in 98.5% of the cases. Cardozo,
Holmes's replacement, moved right into Holmes's spot in the liberal
bloc, agreeing with Stone in 98.2% of the cases. Stone and Brandeis,
the only two liberals to sit throughout the entire 1930-1936 period
disagreed only twenty-two times in more than one thousand cases.
TABLE 27
LIBERALS' DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OaTOBER 1929 THROUGH 1935 TERMS
CARDOZO STONE BRANDEIS HOLMES
CARDOZO 1.8% 3.7%
12/669 25/672
2.1% 1.5%STONE 
_ 22/1047 5/331
BRANDEIS 0.6%2/344
HOLMES
Naturally, disagreement rates between the conservative and lib-
eral Justices were substantially higher. By modern standards, how-
ever, disagreement rates between Justices at the Court's right and
left extremes were surprisingly low. In the 1950's and 1970's, disa-
greement rates above 50% became common, and occasionally disa-
greement rates approached 70%. In contrast, the highest overall disa-
greement rates in the 1930-1936 period was 12.9% (Cardozo-
Butler). As Table 28 shows, the highest disagreement rates were be-
tween Cardozo and Stone, on the left, and McReynolds and Butler
on the right.
The conservative edge in the won-lost column was gained pri-
marily through the support of Roberts. In his first Term, Roberts
lined up with the liberals, giving them their only winning Term. In
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TABLE 28
DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1929 THROUGH 1935 TERMS
CARDOZO STONE BRANDEIS HOLMES
10.3% 9.7% 8.9% 7.3%VAN DEVANTER 69/679 101/1044 94/1062 25/344
11.3% 10.4% 9.2% 6.4%SUTHERLAND 76/672 109/1051 98/1063 22/342
12.9% 11.5% 10.2% 8.1%BUTLER 87/676 121/1055 109/1068 28/344
12.2% 11.4% 10.7% 9.1%McREYNOLDS 82/673 120/1050 113/1060 31/342
the remaining five terms, Roberts was right of center. The following
table shows that Roberts was closest to Hughes and disagreed with
the liberals, on the average, nearly twice as often as with the
conservatives.
TABLE 29
ROBERTS'S DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1930 THROUGH 1935 TERMS
DISAGREEMENT RATE
JUSTICE WITH ROBERTS
LIBERALS
Cardozo 10.1%
Stone 8.1%
Brandeis 6.8%
Holmes 4.3%
Average 7.8%
MODERATE
Hughes 3.4%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 4.1%
Sutherland 3.8%
Butler 4.8%
McReynolds 5.6%
Average 4.6%
Chief Justice Hughes's voting data place him almost exactly in
the Court's statistical center. His disagreement rates with the Jus-
tices at the Court's extremes were almost perfectly symmetrical: Car-
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dozo, 6.1%; Stone, 6.1%; Butler, 5.9%; McReynolds, 6.3%. Hughes
was closest to Holmes, Roberts, and Van Devanter, the Justices
nearest to the Court's center.
TABLE 30
HUGHES'S DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1929 THROUGH 1935 TERMS
DISAGREEMENT RATE
JUSTICE WITH HUGHES
LIBERALS
Cardozo 6.1%
Stone 6.1%
Brandeis 5.5%
Holmes 3.1%
Average 5.6%
MODERATE
Roberts 3.4%
CONSERVATIVES
Van Devanter 3.5%
Sutherland 4.4%
Butler 5.9%
McReynolds 6.3%
Average 5.0%
As previously stated, perhaps the most striking feature of the
voting data for the October 1929 through 1935 Terms was the ex-
ceptionally low dissent and disagreement rates. Although the follow-
ing table shows the very high percentage of unanimous decisions and
the low dissent and disagreement rates, it also shows a trend toward
reduced unanimity and increased dissent and disagreement rates dur-
ing the 1929 through 1936 period. The doubling of the average dis-
sent rates from the October 1929 to the October 1935 Term suggests
that the modern trend toward higher dissent rates was already un-
derway in the early 1930's.
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TABLE 31
MISCELLANEOUS VOTING DATA -
OCTOBER 1929 THROUGH 1935 TERMS
UNANIMOUS AVERAGE DISSENTS HIGHEST FULL-TERM
TERM DECISIONS PER CASE DISAGREEMENT RATE
Oct. 1929 91.0% 0.26 9.0%
Oct. 1930 89.2% 0.28 10.1%
Oct. 1931 82.7% 0.39 13.3%
Oct. 1932 83.9% 0.38 12.7%
Oct. 1933 82.8% 0.42 14.2%
Oct. 1934 86.6% 0.38 11.5%
Oct. 1935 82.1% 0.53 16.0%
Average 85.4% 0.38 12.4%
B. Substantive Legal Trends
Undoubtedly, the main business of the Court in the 1930-1936
period comprised "economic cases." Civil rights cases, a major docket
item of the post-1937 Court, still represented a minor item for the
early Hughes Court. Therefore, analysis of the era's substantive de-
velopments must focus first on economic issues. Most of the numer-
ous economic cases that burden the U.S. Reports of the period in-
volved routine interpretation of tax, bankruptcy, insolvency, and
personal injury statutes or routine review of administrative decisions.
The more interesting cases, in contrast, involved constitutional cen-
sorship of economic regulations.
The 1930-1936 Court is most famous for its economic conserva-
tism which culminated in its attack on the New Deal in 1935 and
1936. The leading cases in this field were Panama Refining Co. v.
Ryan," the "hot oil" case; Railroad Retirement Board v. Alton
R.R. Co., " the railroad pension case; A.L.A. Schechter Poultry
Corp. v. United States,'0 the "sick chicken" case; Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford," the farm mortgage case; Humphrey's
Executor v. United States,4' the President's removal power case;
United States v. Butler,'8 the Agricultural Adjustment Act case;
38. 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (8-1).
39. 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (5-4).
40. 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (9-0).
41. 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (9-0).
42. 295 U.S. 602 (1935) (9-0).
43. 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (6-3).
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Jones v. SEC," the Securities Act case; Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,46
the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act case; and Moorehead v. New
York ex rel. Tipaldo," the New York minimum wage case. This
notorious series of cases tore gaping holes in the web of legislation
enacted by state and federal legislators to combat the Depression. 47
The Court used a variety of constitutional theories to roll back
anti-Depression economic reforms. The centerpiece of the Court's ju-
risprudence was substantive due process, that is, the concept that un-
reasonable infringements of economic liberty are unconstitutional.
The Court applied this principle in an aggressive, nondeferential
manner, substituting its judgment for that of the legislature when-
ever a majority of Justices believed a statute to be unreasonable. 4"
The Court also relied upon the tenth amendment doctrine of dual
federalism, ' the newly-coined concept of unlawful delegation of leg-
islative power," the equal protection clause," the privileges and im-
munities clause,"" the dormant commerce clause, 8 the doctrine of in-
tergovernmental immunity," and the contract clause."
Of course, conservative constitutional activism was not the
whole story in economic cases decided during the 1930-1936 period.
In most cases, the Court restricted itself to the normal judicial role of
interpreting and enforcing economic statutes. Moreover, celebrated
liberal victories in divided economic cases were not entirely absent."
However, the early Hughes Court's most famous economic cases in-
44. 298 U.S. I (1936) (6-3).
45. 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (5-4).
46. 298 U.S. 587 (1936) (5-4)
47. The Court's attack on the New Deal culminated on "Black Monday," May 27,
1935, when the Schechter, Radford, and Humphrey cases were decided. See R. JAwSoN,
supra note 23, at 106.
48. E.g., Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936); Louisville Joint
Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935); Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R.
Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935); United Rys. & Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234 (1929).
49. E.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1936).
50. E.g., A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1936).
51. E.g., Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935); Stewart Dry Goods Co. v. Lewis,
294 U.S. 550 (1935).
52. E.g., Colgate v. Harvey, 296 U.S. 404 (1935).
53. E.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935); New Jersey Bell Tel. Co.
v. State Rd. of Taxes & Assessment, 280 U.S. 338 (1929).
54. E.g., Missouri ex rel. Missouri Ins. Co. v. Gehner, 281 U.S. 213 (1930).
55. E.g., W.B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934).
56. E.g., Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935) (5-4) (contract
clause; gold clauses); Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934) (5-4) (substantive due pro-
cess; rate regulation); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (5-4) (con-
tract clause; mortgage moratorium).
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volved constitutional censorship of economic legislation.
The Court issued only four non-summary decisions involving
first amendment issues in the 1930-1936 period. This is an amaz-
ingly small number in comparison to the plethora of first amendment
cases in later years. Three of the cases are well-known and have a
distinctly liberal-activist flavor. Stromberg v. California7 was the
first case ever to reverse a state-criminal conviction for violating the
first and fourteenth amendments. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, a
an acknowledged landmark of first amendment law, made two major
contributions: (1) it "incorporated" the freedom of press guarantee,
making that provision applicable to the States for the first time, and
(2) it established a strong constitutional presumption against prior
restraints. Grossjean v. American Press Co.,"' held a publisher's li-
cense tax based on gross receipts to be an unconstitutional abridg-
ment of the freedoms of speech and the press. In the only other first
amendment case, Herndon v. Georgia,e0 the Court refused to reach
the merits, holding that the federal issues had not been properly
presented. Overall, the Court made a small contribution indeed to
the advancement of first amendment law in the period under
consideration.
The Court was almost completely passive in the race discrimi-
nation field during the 1930-1936 period. Apart from criminal pro-
cedure cases, in which race was merely an incidental feature, 1 the
Court decided only five cases involving racial discrimination. This
amounts to an average of less than one case a Term. The field was
almost dormant, in striking contrast to later years when race rela-
tions was a prolific docket item. And when the Hughes Court did
handle race issues, the results were mixed. Only three of the five
cases were noteworthy. First, Nixon v. Condon" held unconstitu-
tional a white primary system in which the State had delegated
voter-selection power to the Democratic Party's executive committee,
which in turn banned blacks from voting in the primary. Second,
57. 283 U.S. 359 (1931) (7-2) (the "red flag" case; McReynolds and Butler dissented).
58. 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (5-4) (the Four Horsemen dissented).
59. 297 U.S. 233 (1936) (9-0).
60. 295 U.S. 441 (1935) (6-3) (the three liberals dissented).
61. E.g., Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (conviction of black defendant re-
versed because based on coerced confession); Herndon v. Georgia, 295 U.S. 441 (1935) (incit-
ing insurrection conviction of black Communist upheld); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45
(1932) (conviction of nine black defendants reversed because of failure to provide adequate
appointed counsel).
62. 286 U.S. 73 (1932) (5-4) (the Four Horsemen dissented).
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Norris v. Alabama6 s provided an updated test for detecting unconsti-
tutional grand jury discrimination and reversed a rape conviction be-
cause the jury selection system failed to comply with the new test.
Third, Grovey v. Townsend" nullified Nixon v. Condon by uphold-
ing a white primary where the exclusion of blacks was imposed by
the state political party convention. Since the modest liberalization of
the jury discrimination rules was probably more than offset by the
retrenchment on the white primary/state action issue, the overall
outcome of the Court's efforts was arguably a slight regression.
In contrast to first amendment and race discrimination cases,
the 1930-1936 Court did decide a substantial number of cases in
criminal procedure, the third major domain of civil rights law.
Moreover, several acknowledged landmark decisions were issued.
The most famous, no doubt, were Powell v. Alabama" and Brown
v. Mississippi.6 Powell, the first Scottsboro case, was the earliest
case to hold that failure by a State to provide an indigent criminal
defendant with adequate assistance by appointed counsel violates the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. On this basis, the
Court reversed the convictions of nine black youths after a highly
publicized Alabama rape trial. Similarly, Brown was the first case
holding that the use of a coerced confession to convict a criminal
defendant violates fourteenth amendment due process. The Court
also issued a few well-known criminal procedure decisions involving
federal criminal prosecutions. The most famous were Blockburger v.
United States,67 which enumerated the modem test for determining
when multiple convictions for the same course of conduct are al-
lowed, and Sorrels v. United States," which set forth the modern
test for entrapment.
But, in spite of occasional high points, the overall impact of the
1930-1936 Court was minimal in the criminal procedure field. The
Court continued to hold that the criminal procedure provisions of the
Bill of Rights-fourth amendment, self-incrimination, double jeop-
ardy, jury trial, assistance of counsel, etc.-do not apply to the states.
Thus, the only major constitutional handle on the state courts, where
63. 294 U.S. 587 (1935) (8-0) (the second Scottsboro case).
64. 295 U.S. 45 (1935) (9-0). The case was overruled by the Stone Court nine years
later in Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944).
65. 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (7-2) (Butler and McReynolds dissented).
66. 297 U.S. 278 (1936) (9-0).
67. 284 U.S. 299 (1932) (9-0).
68. 287 U.S. 435 (1932) (5-4) (the split was unusual-Stone, Brandeis, and Roberts
dissented to the left, while McReynolds dissented to the right).
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nine out of ten prosecutions take place, was the fourteenth amend-
ment due process clause. The Court held that all that due process
requires is a trial not so fundamentally unfair as to "shock the con-
science." The case that best illustrates the Court's general rule of
judicial restraint was Snyder v. Massachusetts,9 which held that the
fourteenth amendment does not require jury trial, indictment, or
compliance with the privilege against self-incrimination. Liberal-ac-
tivist due process decisions like Powell and Brown were the rare ex-
ceptions. Viewed as a whole, the Court's contribution to the criminal
procedure field was almost as meager as its contribution to the first
amendment and race relation fields.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court of the 1930-1936 period was made up of a
cohesive four-vote conservative wing, a cohesive three-vote liberal
wing, and two moderates. Unanimous decisions were issued in 85.4%
of the cases, but when bloc-voting was present, the conservatives won
nearly two-thirds due to support from the moderate-conservative
Roberts and the moderate Hughes. Conservative dominance was
most pronounced in the October 1934 and 1935 Terms when the
Court challenged the New Deal, creating a constitutional impasse
and temporarily nullifying the nation's ability to combat the Depres-
sion. A few advances, although minor, were made in civil liberties
cases involving the first amendment and criminal procedure. In all,
the period was a backwater of Supreme Court history, an era whose
most famous cases were swept away by the constitutional revolution
of 1937 and the ensuing era of economic liberalism.
69. 291 U.S. 97 (1934) (5-4) (the split was unusual-Cardozo, Stone, and Hughes
joined McReynolds and Van Devanter in support of the reactionary decision, while Butler,
Sutherland, Roberts, and Brandeis dissented).
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APPENDIX A
TABLE I
DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OcTOBER 1929 TERM
%b 0.8 1.5 3.8 17.6 10.8 7.6 8.3 9.0 9.0#c 1/133 2/131 2/53 6/34 7/65 10/13111/13312/13312/133
% 0.8 3.8 14.7 7.7 6.9 7.5 8.3 8.3# 1/131 2/53 5/34 5/65 9/131 10/13311/13311/133
% 3.8 9.1 4.7 5.4 6.1 6.9 6.9# S- 2/52 3/33 3/64 7/129 8/131 9/131 9/131
% 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0# 0/51 0/53 0/53 0/53
TAF% 0.0 0.0 2.9 2.9 2.9
# 1 0/34 0/34 1/34 1/34 1/34
SANFORD 0.0 1.5 3.1 3.1# 0/65 1/65 2/65 2/65
MR% 0.8 1.5 1.5
# 1/133 2/133 2/133
% 0.8 0.8SUTHERLAND %0. 08# E1/133 1/133
VAN % 0.0
DEVANTER # 0/133
BUTLER %#
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
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TABLE 2
DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1930 TERM
[Vol. 24
STONE %b 0.6 1.3 1.9 2.6 6.3 7.0 
7.6 10.1
#c _ 1/158 2/158 3/154 4/154 10/158 11/158 12/158 16/158
% 0.6 1.3 3.1 5.4 6.1 6.6 9.6
# B 1/166 2/158 5/162 9/166 10/165 11/166 16/166
% 0.6 2.5 4.8 3.6 6.0 9.6
HoLmEs # 1/158 4/162 8/166 6/165 10/166 16/166
% 2.6 3.8 4.4 5.1 8.9
# 4/155 6/158 7/159 8/158 14/158
RBRS % 
3.7 4.3 4.9 7.4
ROBERTS
# 6/162 7/161 8/162 12/162
VAN % 0.6 1.2 6.0
DEVANTER # 1/165 2/166 10/166
S o 
1.8 5.5
SUTHERLAND %1. 
55
# 3/165 9/165
BUTLER 
4.8
# 8/166
MCREYNOLDS %
a Total 'number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
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TABLE 3
DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1931 TERM
%b 2.4 0.0 11.1 11.1 11.4 11.1 13.3 11.1#c 1/42 0/45 5/45 5/45 5/44 5/45 6/45 5/45
% 1.4 0.0 9.2 7.8 11.3 11.2 11.9 13.3
STONE 2/143 0/48 13/14211/14116/14216/14317/14319/143
% 2.0 8.8 7.4 10.7 11.3 12.0 12.7# 1/51 13/148 11/148 16/14917/150 18/15019/150
% 8.2 6.0 12.0 15.7 15.7 11.8# 4/49 3/50 6/50 8/51 8/51 6/51
% 1.4 2.0 2.0 2.7 4.1# 2/147 3/148 3/148 4/148 6/148
ROBERTS 3.4 4.1 4.7 5.4# 5/148 6/148 7/148 8/148
% 2.0 2.0 4.7
SUTHERLAND # 3/149 3/149 7/149
VAN % 2.0 5.3
DEVANTER # 3/150 8/150
BUTLER % 6.0# _9/150
McREYNOLDS #1
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
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TABLE 4
DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1932 TERM
[Vol. 24
%b 2.4 3.6 7.3 7.2 9.7 10.8 11.3 12.7#c 4/168 6/166 12/164 12/166 16/165 18/167 19/168 21/166
% 6.0 4.9 7.8 7.3 9.6 11.3 11.4# 110/166 8/164 13/166 12/165 16/167 19/168 19/166
% 6.1 5.5 7.4 8.5 9.0 10.4# 10/163 9/164 12/163 14/165 15/166 17/164
% 2.5 1.9 3.7 6.1 8.0HUGHES # 4/162 3/161 6/163 10/164 13/163
% 3.1 4.2 3.6 7.3ROBERM /S# 5/163 7/165 6/166 12/164
VAN % 1.2 4.2 4.9
DEVANTER # 2/164 7/165 8/163
SUTHERLAND 5.4 3.0# 9/167 5/165
MR 6.6
McREYNOLDS%6.# 11/166
BUTLER %
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
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TABLE 5
DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OcToBER 1933 TERM
; -. 1P~ 1iPe
STONE 2.6 5.2 6.5 9.7 10.5 11.8 13.5 14.2#c 4/155 8/155 10/154 15/154 16/153 18/152 21/155 22/155
% 5.1 5.1 9.6 9.0 10.4 12.1 12.7# 8/157 8/156 15/156 14/156 16/154 19/157 20/157
% 5.1 4.5 7.7 7.8 10.8 8.9# 8/156 7/156 12/156 12/154 17/157 14/157
% 5.2 4.5 5.9 7.7 8.3# 8/155 7/154 9/153 12/156 13/156
% 4.5 3.3 6.4 4.5# R7/154 5/153 10/156 7/156
VAN % 1.3 4.5 3.9
DEVANTER # 2/153 7/155 6/155
s 4.5 2.6
SUTHERLAND %4. 26# 7/154 4/154
McREYNOLDS 4.5
# 7/157
BUTLER %
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
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TABLE 6
DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1934 TERM
[Vol. 24
%b 2.5 1.9 5.2 7.6 10.2 10.2 9.8 11.5STONE8/
#c 4/157 3/154 8/155 12/157 16/157 16/157 15/153 18/157
% 3.2 6.5 8.9 10.2 10.2 9.8 11.5
# 5/154 10/155 14/157 16/157 16/157 15/153 18/157
7D 4.6 7.1 9.7 9.7 10.0 11.0
# 7/152 11/154 15/154 15/154 15/150 17/154
% 2.6 5.2 5.2 5.3 6.5
# E4/155 8/155 8/155 8/151 10/155
ROBERTS 5.1 5.1 5.2 3.8
# 8/157 8/157 8/153 6/157
VAN % 0.0 0.0 1.3
DEVANTER # 0/157 0/153 2/157
SUTHERLAND 
0.0 1.3
# 0/153 2/157
% 1.3
MCREYNOLDS 
13
# 2/1531
BUTLER #
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
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TABLE 7
DISAGREEMENT RATES -
OCTOBER 1935 TERM
CARDOZO 0.0 0.7 8.4 14.7 13.5 15.3 15.2 16.0#c 10/141 1/144 12/143 21/143 19/141 22/144 22/145 23/144
% 0.7 7.9 14.4 13.1 14.9 14.9 15.7#SO 1/140 11/139 20/139 18/137 21/141 21/141 22/140
% 7.7 14.1 12.9 14.7 14.6 15.4# R11/142 20/142 18/140 21/143 21/144 22/143
H H 6.4 5.0 7.0 7.0 7.7# 9/141 7/139 10/142 10/143 11/142
% 4.3 2.1 3.5 5.6# 6/139 3/143 5/143 8/142
VAN % 2.1 2.1 2.9
DEVANTER # 13/140 3/141 4/140
% 1.4 2.8# 2/144 4/143
BUTLER 1.4
# 2/144
McREYNOLDSL #
a Total number of cases in which Justice participated
b Disagreement rate
c Ratio of disagreements to number of cases in which both Justices participated
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APPENDIX B
TABLE 1
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1929 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Holmes 134 10 7.5% %
Brandeis 134 9 6.7% %
Stone 130 7 5.4% %
Hughes 53 0 0.0% %
Taft 34 0 0.0% %
Sanford 64 0 0.0% %
McReynolds 132 0 0.0% %
Sutherland 134 1 0.7% %
Van Devanter 134 2 1.5% %
Butler 134 2 1.5% %
TABLE 2
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1930 TERM
,JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Stone 158 6 3.8% -1.6%
Brandeis 166 5 3.0% - 3.7%
Holmes 166 4 2.4% -5.1%
Hughes 158 2 1.3% +1.3%
Roberts 162 2 1.2% +1.2%
Van Devanter 166 4 2.4% +0.9%
Sutherland 165 5 3.0% +2.3%
Butler 166 6 3.6% +2.1%
McReynolds 166 12 7.2% +7.2%
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TABLE 3
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1931 TERM
JUSTICE CASES Diss wTs RATES CHANGE
Holmes 45 5 11.1% +8.7%
Stone 143 13 9.1% +5.3%
Brandeis 150 13 8.7% +5.7%
Cardozo 51 4 7.8% - %
Hughes 148 0 0.0% -1.3%
Roberts 148 2 1.4% +0.2%
Sutherland 149 3 2.0% -1.0%
Van Devanter 150 4 2.7% +0.3%
Butler 150 5 3.3% -0.3%
McReynolds 150 6 4.0% -3.2%
TABLE 4
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1932 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Stone 168 13 7.7% -1.4%
Cardozo 168 11 6.5% -1.3%
Brandeis 166 9 5.4% -3.3%
Hughes 164 3 1.8% +1.8%
Roberts 166 2 1.2% -0.2%
Van Devanter 165 3 1.8% +0.9%
Sutherland 167 5 3.0% +1.0%
McReynolds 168 8 4.8% +0.8%
Butler 166 10 6.0% +2.7%
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TABLE 5
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1933 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Stone 155 13 8.4% +0.7%
Cardozo 157 11 7.0% +0.5%
Brandeis 157 9 5.7% +0.3%
Hughes 156 4 2.6% +0.8%
Roberts 156 4 2.6% + 1.4%
Van Devanter 155 3 1.9% +0.1%
Sutherland 154 5 3.2% +0.2%
McReynolds 157 8 5.1% +0.3%
Butler 157 9 5.7% -0.3%
TABLE 6
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1934 TERM
.AUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Stone 157 11 7.0% -1.4%
Cardozo 157 11 7.0% 0.0%
Brandeis 154 10 6.5% +0.8%
Hughes 155 3 1.9% -0.7%
Roberts 157 3 1.9% -0.7%
Van Devanter 157 5 3.2% +1.3%
Sutherland 157 5 3.2% 0.0%
McReynolds 153 5 3.3% -1.8%
Butler 157 7 4.5% -1.2%
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TABLE 7
DISSENT RATES - OCTOBER 1935 TERM
JUSTICE CASES DISSENTS RATES CHANGE
Cardozo 145 17 11.7% +4.7%
Stone 141 16 11.3% +4.3%
Brandeis 144 16 11.1% +4.6%
Hughes 143 5 3.5% +1.6%
Roberts 143 4 2.8% +0.9%
Van Devanter 141 2 1.4% -1.8%
Sutherland 144 5 3.5% +0.3%
Butler 145 5 3.4% -1.1%
McReynolds 144 6 4.2% +0.9%

